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AUTONOMY, PLURALISM, AND 
CONTRACT LAW THEORY 
HANOCH DAGAN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The proposition that the commitment to individual autonomy is one of the 
most important foundations of contract is a truism, almost a cliché.1 Contract, in 
this common account, is the legal cousin of the social practice of promise and 
voluntary obligation, and the significance of that social practice to autonomy 
implies that contract law should be guided by the will of the parties or by their 
mutual consent. Accordingly, contract law, in this view, is both passive and 
structurally monist. It should be relatively passive due to the injunction to 
merely piggyback on people’s expressions of their will, and it should be 
structurally monist—a unified body of doctrine guided by one regulative 
principle—because its normative underpinnings are the same irrespective of the 
type of contract at hand.2 
But the seemingly necessary association of autonomy-based justifications of 
contract with passivity and structural monism is mistaken.3 It underrates the 
significance of the shift from the social (and moral) to the legal both in terms of 
the value of the pertinent practice and the potential for securing this value in 
the real world. Contract law facilitates—at times even enables—many more 
forms of voluntary obligations than its social counterpart, notably obligations 
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 1.  To be sure, although some contract theorists find autonomy to be the sole basis of contract, 
many invoke other values—notably efficiency—as well.  
 2.  See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION (1981); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986). 
 3.  This mistake is also unfortunate. As the following text argues, it tends to misdirect contract 
lawyers who are committed to autonomy. Furthermore, it may also imply that lawyers who believe that 
contract law can, and should, serve other values besides autonomy should resist, or at least minimize, 
the significance of autonomy to contracts. 
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between strangers that may be too risky without legal facilitation. Indeed, 
insofar as the ideal of autonomy as self-authorship is concerned,4 expanding 
these possibilities of interpersonal interactions may well be contract law’s most 
important mission. This potential role of contract law in offering people a 
diverse set of robust frameworks to organize their lives, which thus contributes 
to their ability to be the authors of their own lives, implies that an autonomy-
based justification of contract should be neither passive nor structurally monist.5 
Quite the contrary, it prescribes a structurally pluralist theory of contract, in 
which contract law is an umbrella of a diverse set of institutions, and each 
institution responds to a different regulative principle—that is, each vindicates a 
distinct balance of values in accordance with its characteristic subject matter 
and the ideal type of relationships it anticipates.6 
Revisiting Joseph Raz’s account of the relationship between contract law 
and voluntary obligations is particularly helpful for establishing these claims 
and pointing out the ways in which these mistakes can be corrected. Although 
rather brief and scattered, Raz’s remarks on contracts—which, like other 
autonomy-based theories, offer a rather passive and structurally monist account 
of contract law—“continue to resonate in the literature”7 and are likely to be 
further influential given his prominence as a legal philosopher. But Raz is also 
one of our most distinguished political philosophers, and as such he is closely 
identified with the notion that a commitment to autonomy as self-authorship 
imposes on the state important responsibilities in supporting pluralism. Thus, 
Raz’s own theory of autonomy and its implications for the role of the state and 
its law provides the best foundation for correcting the blemishes in his (and 
others’) autonomy-based account of contract.8 
 
 4.  This ideal of personal autonomy is clearly distinguished from Kant’s conception of personal 
independence, which is exhausted by the requirement that no one gets to tell anyone else what 
purposes to pursue and is thus not a good to be promoted but a constraint on the conduct of others. See 
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 14, 34, 45 
(2009). 
 5.  Arguably, efficiency may also serve as the normative foundation of structural pluralism, but 
for this it is not enough to show that efficiency considerations underlie many rules of various contract 
institutions. Rather, one must demonstrate that, like autonomy, efficiency also entails a robust 
commitment to pluralism. Furthermore, even if such a claim can be substantiated, there are likely to be 
differences between autonomy-based pluralism and efficiency-based pluralism. See infra text 
accompanying note 92; see also infra note 107. 
 6.  This revised autonomy-based justification of contract law may also support the view that 
autonomy is not very informative as per the law that should govern commercial contracts between large 
businesses. Cf. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 
YALE L.J. 541, 556 (2003).  
 7.  Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1726, 1774 (2008).  
 8.  This article brackets the question of the institutional source—legislatures or courts—of the 
various contract institutions. For a related discussion regarding property institutions that seems 
applicable mutatis mutandis to contract institutions as well, see generally Hanoch Dagan, Judges and 
Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyam Balganesh ed.) (forthcoming 
2013).  
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II 
RAZ ON CONTRACT LAW 
Raz makes two explicit claims regarding contracts, and his discussion 
includes or implies two further propositions. Separating out these four 
propositions is important for the purposes of this article, which builds on the 
first two in order to criticize the others. 
Raz’s first proposition, and the starting point of his analysis of contracts, 
relates to the purpose of contract law. Raz argues that “[t]he purpose of 
contract law should be not to enforce promises, but to protect both the practice 
of undertaking voluntary obligations and the individuals who rely on that 
practice.”9 The shift from enforcing promises to protecting the practice of 
undertaking voluntary obligations is consequential to the way we should shape 
the law. As he explains, “[o]ne enforces a promise by making the promisor 
perform it, or failing that, by putting the promisee in a position as similar as 
possible to that he would have occupied had the promisor respected the 
promise. One protects the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations by 
preventing its erosion—by making good any harm caused by its use or abuse.”10 
But why should the law protect the practice of undertaking voluntary 
obligations? Raz realizes of course the significance of this question. By 
protecting this practice the law sanctions the “special bond” between the parties 
which requires “the promisor to be, in the matter of the promise, partial to the 
promisee.”11 Although promises are not absolutely binding—they do not 
exclude all other considerations12—they nonetheless exclude at least some 
reasons for nonperformance.13 Promises thus privilege one special relationship, 
“oblig[ing] the promisor to regard the claim of the promisee as not just one of 
the many claims that every person has for his respect and help.”14 Therefore, the 
law would be justified in protecting the practice of promising if and only if “the 
creation of such special relationships between people is held to be valuable.”15 
The second proposition of Raz’s account of contract law is that it is indeed 
“desirable . . . to have a method of giving [others] grounds for reasonable 
reliance . . . by intending to bind oneself.”16 Although he does not elaborate on 
the value which justifies the purpose of contract law, it seems that he finds the 
practice of promising valuable due to both its autonomy-enhancing function 
 
 9.  Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 933 (1982) (reviewing P. S. 
ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210, 227–28 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977). 
 12.  As Stephen Smith seems to argue. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 74–77, 163 
(2004).  
 13.  Raz, supra note 11, at 222–23. 
 14.  Id. at 228. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers (pt. 2), 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN 
SOC’Y 79, 101 (Supp. 1972).  
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and the type of relationships it creates. The practice of undertaking voluntary 
obligations “enable[s] individuals to make their own arrangements,”17 and these 
“special relations,” or “special bonds between people,” which “are voluntarily 
shaped and developed by the choice of participants,” are morally desirable.18 
Raz’s third proposition relates to the nature of contract law, which in his 
view “is primarily supportive.”19 The practice of promising—“unlike the limited 
liability company”—“is not a creation of the law. Rather, it is like ownership 
and the family, which are [all] rooted in moral precepts and in social 
conventions . . . .”20 Therefore, the main task of contract law for Raz is 
“recognizing and reinforcing . . . the social practice of undertaking voluntary 
obligations.”21 This does not mean that the role of contract law is “merely 
passive.” Contract law does influence the social practices it supports. It 
“reinforce[s] confidence in the reliability of existing practices, . . . hindering 
influences that tend to undermine the practices it reinforces.”22 Furthermore, 
contract law also “serves to extend such practices,” making “contracts outside 
the framework of ongoing relations much more common by making them more 
reliable.”23 But “[t]he fact that the law of contracts operates predominantly in a 
supportive . . . role” means that by and large contract law should not be 
understood as “an initiating system, as a means of creating and changing social 
arrangements.”24 
The proposition that “the predominant purpose of contract law is to support 
existing moral practices” has again important doctrinal implications. It explains 
why, by and large, “the conditions of the validity of contracts will reflect 
common moral conceptions concerning the validity of voluntary undertakings,” 
so that “[d]octrines such as the formation of contract, frustration, mistake, 
fraud, duress, unconscionability, and others based on public policy 
considerations might be expected to mirror common moral views.”25 Raz 
mentions only two exceptions to this rule, that law follows conventional “moral 
practices.” First, law “can and should assume some initiatory functions” insofar 
as they “reflect moral conceptions held valid by lawmakers, though not yet 
common in the community” (in matters such as invalidating racist contracts).26  
Second, law “can protect the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations” by 
preventing “people from taking advantage of the practice by making it appear 
that they have agreed to obligations when they have not,” which explains why 
“people who do not make a promise but who knowingly, carelessly, or 
 
 17.  Raz, supra note 9, at 936. 
 18.  Id. at 928. 
 19.  Id. at 933. 
 20.  Id. at 916. 
 21.  Id. at 933. 
 22.  Id. at 934. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 933–34. 
 25.  Id. at 935. 
 26.  Id.  
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negligently behave in a way that creates the impression that they have done so 
should be made to compensate those who innocently rely on the supposed 
promise.”27 
Finally, Raz’s theory of contract law is a structurally monist theory. Like 
other structurally monist theorists of private law or its branches, Raz argues 
that contract law should be guided in its entirety by one regulative principle: 
protecting the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations.28 This (largely 
implicit) proposition is again consequential: this one underlying principle guides 
the development of contract law irrespective of the type of contract at hand—
although the implications of implementing this one principle may of course vary 
in different contractual settings.29 
Raz’s first two propositions regarding the value of the practice of 
undertaking voluntary obligations and the role of contract law in protecting this 
practice are appealing. Although it may be disputed if these are, respectively, 
the only virtues and the sole role of contract law, we can set this question aside, 
because the main point of this article is that even if we stipulate that reinforcing 
the practice of voluntary obligations is the sole purpose of contract law, Raz’s 
third and fourth propositions about contract law must be qualified. In order to 
serve the very purpose and values that Raz ascribes to contract law, it needs to 
be both more active and more fragmented than Raz acknowledges. 
To make good on this critique one needs to further elucidate the moral 
significance of the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations and to explore 
the ways in which the law can actively empower this practice. This is the main 
task of parts IV and V, which—on both fronts—heavily rely on Raz’s own 
account of autonomy and its implications for the role of the state and its laws. 
But before embarking on this mission, a brief summary of two prior friendly 
critiques of Raz’s account of contract law—Gregory Klass’s refinement of 
“Raz’s picture of contract law as both duty imposing and power creating”30 and 
Richard Craswell’s claim that philosophical theories about promising, such as 
Raz’s, are largely irrelevant to contract law31—is in place. 
 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  To clarify, Raz’s regulative principle is not substantively monist. Its virtue, for Raz, “rests . . . 
on its ability to reconcile” law’s facilitative function and the harm principle. Also, Raz is careful not to 
make an overly ambitious descriptive claim. While arguing that “much of the law is consistent with this 
view and many of its doctrines are actually motivated by it,” he adds that “it is not the sole underlying 
theory of the common law,” realizing that “[t]he law reflects too many competing strands of thought.” 
Id. at 933–34. 
 29.  Thus, in discussing remedies, Raz claims that although “enforcing voluntary obligations is not 
itself a proper goal for contract law,” there may be cases in which enforcement is nonetheless “justified 
as a means to that end,” as it may be necessary in order to “prevent[] harm to the contracting parties 
and protect[] the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations from erosion.” Hence, he concludes that 
“[a]n ultimate judgment on the conditions under which enforcement remedies are appropriate requires 
a detailed consideration of various classes of contracts.” Raz, supra note 9, at 937–38. 
 30.  Klass, supra note 7, at 1782–83.  
 31.  Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 489, 489 (1989).  
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III 
TWO PRIOR COMPLAINTS 
Klass reads Raz to argue that contract law justifiably facilitates the norms 
governing certain voluntary obligations “not only because of their morally 
obligatory character,”32 but also because “both undertaking and performing 
those obligations are socially valuable.”33 As he explains, if the former “were 
the only reason for legal enforcement, contract law would have a strictly duty-
imposing function,” and would thus limit itself to enforcing voluntary 
obligations without “giving persons the ability to purposively undertake new 
ones.”34 But in fact contract law as we know it does more than that, as Raz 
indeed indicates. Because contracts are socially desirable, contract law also 
serves “to permit and encourage normative innovation, such as transactions 
between strangers where there is no pre-existing relationship of trust.”35 In this 
capacity, “contract law anticipates and enables” individual actors who “expect 
and want” to effect these normative changes, and in this sense “contract is also 
a legal power.”36 
In acknowledging these two faces of contract, Raz’s theory is, for Klass, an 
example of a pluralist theory of contract, “according to which contract law 
imposes a type of duty that also generates a legal power.”37 This is an important 
achievement because “[c]ontract law is unusual” exactly in that “it is structured 
to do both at once.”38 It is also significant because it “allows us to see how a 
single form of legal liability can serve two such very different functions,” thus 
offering “a nonordered pluralist theory” of contract law while resisting 
recommendations to “divid[e] the law of contracts into different regions, each 
governed by a single principle.”39 
Klass claims, however, that Raz goes wrong in underrating the significance 
of the second function of contract law, which diverges from the extralegal, and 
therefore mischaracterizes the relationship between extralegal and legal 
voluntary obligations. Thus, a person who is willing to undertake a moral 
obligation does not necessarily want also “to be legally obliged to comply with 
it”—especially given the legal remedies for breach of contract.40 Furthermore, 
“it is far from obvious that . . . the legal consequences of entering into an 
agreement for consideration approximate the extralegal ones”—for example, 
“[n]onmajoritarian or untailored interpretive defaults are . . . likely to produce a 
 
 32.  Raz, in fact, believes that state enforcement of moral obligations per se is not justified. See 
Raz, supra note 9, at 937. 
 33.  Klass, supra note 7, at 1778. 
 34.  Id. at 1779. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 1770. 
 38.  Id. at 1783. 
 39.  Id. at 1773.  
 40.  Id. at 1780. 
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gap between the parties’ legal duties and their untutored expectations about 
their obligations to one another.”41 Klass insists that this gap between legal and 
extralegal obligations is important because it implies that “the voluntary 
obligations that contract law supports are not limited to promissory ones and 
need not result from the exercise of a normative power per se,” which falsifies 
the assumption of many promise theorists that “the promisor will anticipate the 
legal consequences of her act.”42 
On its face, Craswell’s critique of the use of theories about promising in 
contract law is unrelated to Klass’s discussion. As Craswell explains, the moral 
obligation of promise-keeping dictates that the promisor fulfill the obligations 
prescribed by the combination of the express language she used and the legal 
background rules that “fill out the details of what it is [she] has to remain 
faithful to, or what [her] prior commitment is deemed to be.” Thus, the value of 
promise-keeping “cannot guide the legal system in deciding which background 
rules to adopt in the first place.”43 Unless the scope of the promisor’s obligation 
or the consequences of non-performance are explicitly defined by the promise 
itself, the law must resolve these issues.44 With the exception of a background 
rule that would render performance totally optional, the value of promise-
keeping is neutral in relation to any possible set of background rules. Promise-
keeping requires that the promised course of conduct is made “non-optional to 
some degree” but does not dictate any particular degree of non-optionality.45 
Thus, for example, although promise-keeping requires that some sort of 
sanction be imposed in cases of non-performance, it does not entail any 
preference of one remedy over another.46 
Craswell concludes, more generally, that theories which found the binding 
force of promises on individual autonomy “have little or no relevance to those 
parts of contract law that govern the proper remedies for breach, the conditions 
under which the promisor is excused from her duty to perform, or the 
additional obligations (such as implied warranties) imputed to the promisor as 
an implicit part of her promise.”47 In this vein, Craswell exempts Raz’s account 
from the charge of irrelevance. In Craswell’s reading, the binding force of 
promises for Raz rests on “the value of the special relationships which promises 
create,” and may thus nonetheless inform contract law by pointing out “which 
 
 41.  Id. at 1781. 
 42.  Id. at 1782. 
 43.  Craswell, supra note 31, at 490. Others have attempted to show that the value of promise-
keeping is informative, notwithstanding Craswell’s claim of irrelevance, but they are by and large 
unconvincing. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 269–72 (2004). But 
see EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY 306 (2010).  
 44.  Craswell, supra note 31, at 515–16. 
 45.  Id. at 518 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 489.  
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of all possible relationships [are] the most valuable,” recommending the 
adoption of “background rules that best facilitate[] those relationships.”48 
Both contributions are important in considering Raz’s theory of contract 
law. Klass is probably too critical of Raz in (correctly) insisting that the 
voluntary obligations which contract law supports are not only promissory—
recall that Raz’s account implies that protecting the practice of undertaking 
voluntary obligations may indeed require non-promissory-based liability.49 But 
Klass is correct in arguing that contract law is much more significant for the 
legal practice of contracts than the idiom “primarily supportive” suggests. As 
part IV demonstrates, however, Klass’s critique on this front is only the tip of 
the iceberg. Appreciating the demands of Raz’s account of autonomy requires 
an even more significant qualification of Raz’s third proposition. 
Likewise, Craswell’s complaint of irrelevance is important because it should 
affect Raz, who finds much of the value of promising in autonomy.50 The 
remedy for this complaint is not, however, to focus on a particular type of 
relationship contract law should nourish, as Craswell implies, but rather to 
qualify the idea of a monist contract law theory. As part V shows, Raz’s account 
of autonomy demands a structurally pluralistic theory of contract—exactly the 
kind of theory Klass believes that Raz helps avoiding—and this type of theory 
provides rather robust prescriptive recommendations throughout the 
contractual domain. 
It is indeed time now to shift gears to the main task of this article: using 
Raz’s rich conception of personal autonomy in order to critique the view that 
contract law has, and should have, only a limited “initiative” role and that it is a 
rather unified body of law, which should be guided by one regulative principle. 
As will be seen, a commitment to personal autonomy à la Raz requires a 
different understanding of contract law. This conception of contract law is, with 
Klass, much more appreciative of the active role of this body of law.  Likewise, 
a commitment to personal autonomy in contract must take the heterogeneity of 
our existing contract doctrines seriously and endorse a structurally pluralist 
understanding of contract law as an umbrella of contract institutions. In this 
view, each institution responds to a different regulative principle, namely, each 
vindicates a distinct balance of values and a distinct set of purposes suitable for 
its particular subject matter. This “truly Razian” conception of contracts 
includes much more refined instructions than the command to protect the 
practice of undertaking voluntary obligations, demonstrating that, at least in its 
Razian rendition, a commitment to personal autonomy can be, pace Craswell, 
quite informative to contract law. 
 
 48.  Id. at 510. 
 49.  See supra text accompanying note 27. See also Hanoch Sheinman, Contractual Liability and 
Voluntary Undertakings, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 216–19 (2000). 
 50.  See supra text accompanying note 18. To be sure, there are other readings of Raz that 
emphasize the element of “special relationships.” See, e.g., Daniel Markovits, Contract and 
Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1440–41 (2004).  
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IV 
RAZIAN AUTONOMY AND ENABLING LAW 
The starting point of analysis on both fronts is Raz’s conception of the ideal 
of personal autonomy as self-authorship. For Raz, the prescription of 
autonomy—that people should, to some degree, be the authors of their own 
lives—requires not only appropriate mental abilities and independence, but also 
“an adequate range of options.”51 Whereas a wide range of valuable sets of 
social forms is available to societies pursuing the ideal of autonomy, autonomy 
“cannot be obtained within societies which support social forms that do not 
leave enough room for individual choice.”52 For choice to be effective, for 
autonomy to be meaningful, there must be (other things being equal) “more 
valuable options than can be chosen, and they must be significantly different,” 
so that choices involve “tradeoffs, which require relinquishing one good for the 
sake of another.”53 Thus, because autonomy admits and indeed emphasizes “the 
value of a large number of greatly differing pursuits among which individuals 
are free to choose,”54 valuing autonomy inevitably “leads to the endorsement of 
moral pluralism.”55 
Indeed, given the diversity of acceptable human goods from which 
autonomous people should be able to choose and their distinct constitutive 
values, the state must recognize a sufficiently diverse set of robust frameworks 
for people to organize their lives. At least if read strictly, Raz’s third 
proposition might undermine this important prescription, insofar as it implies 
that, subject to the two limited exceptions noted above,56 contract law is, and 
should be, merely supportive of our extralegal conventions. The reason for this 
is that, as Raz insists, the state’s mission of fostering diversity and multiplicity 
cannot be properly accomplished by a hands-off attitude of the law, because 
such an attitude “would undermine the chances of survival of many cherished 
aspects of our culture.”57 A commitment to personal autonomy thus requires the 
liberal state, through its laws, to more actively “enable individuals to pursue 
valid conceptions of the good”58 by providing “a multiplicity of valuable 
options.”59 
Contract law indeed plays a crucial role in the practice of undertaking 
voluntary obligations and thus in the Razian ideal of personal autonomy as self-
authorship.60 Contract law expands “the range of options available to 
 
 51.  JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 372 (1986). Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, 
STATE, AND UTOPIA 309–12 (1974).   
 52.  RAZ, supra note 51, at 395. 
 53.  Id. at 398. 
 54.  Id. at 381. 
 55.  Id. at 399. 
 56.  See supra text accompanying note 27.  
 57.  RAZ, supra note 51, at 162. 
 58.  Id. at 133. 
 59.  Id. at 265. 
 60.  As the text implies, the discussion that follows brackets the question whether the difference of 
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individuals,” thus increasing “the possibility of autonomous action.” And 
although it is difficult to define “what constitutes an ‘adequate range of 
options,’” it seems plausible that “the range of options that exist in a society 
without contract law will sometimes be inadequate” and that “contract law 
makes available options that would otherwise be unavailable.”61 
An important reason for this proposition begins with the claim, already 
raised by Klass, that contract law plays an important role in enabling us to 
engage in the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations with strangers. 
Although moral commitments, social norms, and reputational concerns often 
provide some assurances,62 the legal protection of contractual reliance and 
expectations seems indispensable for a broad social practice of agreements 
between strangers. By subjecting themselves to the potential deployment of 
“the powerful institutionalized mechanisms” of contract law, people who have 
no preexisting reason to trust one another can cooperate with each other and 
rely on one another, counting on each other’s rationality as the sole necessary 
reassurance.63 
Dori Kimel pushes this point even further, arguing that the intrinsic value of 
contracts is in fact “diametrically opposed” to the value of promises—their 
social counterparts—which promote personal relationships.64 By relying on the 
law, contracts tend to obscure the attitudes and motives of parties, thus 
rendering “contractual conduct largely devoid of expressive content”65 and 
therefore “singularly inadequate . . . to create and enhance personal 
relationships.”66 The value of contracts, Kimel argues, is thus “the value of 
personal detachment,” that is, of “doing certain things with others not only 
outside the context of already-existing relationships, but also without a 
commitment to the future prospect of such relationships.”67 As he explains, 
detachment is valuable “as an alternat[]ive to dependence on (pre-existing, 
future) personal relations. And contracts are valuable as a practice that, with 
 
contract from other forms of voluntary obligations entails significant normative implications. It is 
enough to acknowledge, that if there are such implications, they can refine—or maybe even qualify—
my conclusions.  
 61.  SMITH, supra note 12, at 139–40.  
 62.  See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations and Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
SOC. REV. 55 (1963). See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES 137–47 (1991).  
 63.  DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 
55–65  (2003). See also Michael G. Pratt, Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations, 56 L. & PHIL. 
531, 572 (2007) (“Our capacity to bind ourselves contractually enables us to cooperate with those on 
whose promises we would not otherwise rely . . . , including the untrustworthy and, more importantly, 
the unfamiliar.”); Menachem Mautner, Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What Is So Problematic in 
the Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?, 3 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 545, 554–59 (2002) 
(discussing the pervasive significance of trust on strangers for our daily functioning in modern society 
and arguing that this prevalent experience explains the objective approach in contract law). 
 64.  KIMEL, supra note 63, at 78, 72. 
 65.  Id. at 74. 
 66.  Id. at 77. 
 67.  Id. at 78. 
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regard to a certain range of activities, facilitates this very option.”68 In this way, 
“the legal practice of contract is a source of . . . the freedom from dependence 
upon the very institution—personal relationship—in the enhancement of which 
lies the intrinsic value of the practice’s non-legal equivalent.”69 
Although overstated, as I shortly argue, Kimel’s focus on detachment is 
helpful in demonstrating the requirement of active legal support of contracts. 
Consider consumer transactions, which probably stand for—alongside the 
symmetric discrete arm’s length exchange transactions anticipated by the so-
called classical theory of contract and their service counterparts—the 
paradigmatic contract category that responds to Kimel’s account of 
detachment-based autonomy-enhancing contracts. When an individual interacts 
with a merchant for a relatively inexpensive good or service primarily intended 
for personal, family, or household use, both parties are indeed typically 
uninterested in personal relations, and law seems crucial for opening up the 
option of their transaction in terms of detachment. This option is particularly 
conducive to consumers’ autonomy (the merchant—typically a corporation—is 
in the business of making money), because our ability to make such transactions 
quickly and anonymously allows us to focus our time and attention on our 
valuable projects. But to allow these important benefits, contract law must be—
as it gradually (at times grudgingly) becomes—quite proactive.70 Consumer 
protection, as the body of law governing these transactions is now called, is 
accordingly a robust contract institution, typically imposing on businesses 
heightened duties of product safety and of disclosure and affording consumers 
wide powers of cancellation, which all go way beyond the protective measures 
anticipated by “classical” contract law.71 
The virtue of contract is not limited, however, to enabling cooperation-in-
personal-detachment.72 Numerous types of contracts (contract institutions in my 
terminology) support long-term interpersonal relationships of cooperation. 
Employment contracts, agency contracts, partnership contracts, landlord-tenant 
contracts, as well as other categories of “relational” contracts,73 which, again, 
form a substantial part of the contractual domain,74 are much more complex 
 
 68.  Id. at 79. 
 69.  Id. at 80. 
 70.  See Joseph William Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law, 47 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 156–58 (2012) (“We want freedom of choice in the marketplace, but we 
also want to choose the contexts within which those choices are made. We want freedom from fear. 
Regulatory laws that set minimum standards for market regulations provide that for us.”).  
 71.  See, e.g., Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994); Oren Bar Gill, Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 749 (2008); Jan M. Smits, Rethinking the Usefulness of Mandatory Rights of Withdrawal in 
Consumer Contract Law: The Right to Change Your Mind?, 29 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 671 (2011).  
 72.  See generally Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 25 
(2002).  
 73.  Such as distributorships, franchises, and joint ventures.  
 74.  Kimel argues that relational contracts are the “clearest illustration” of the tendency of 
“personal detachment and personal relations . . . to be mutually reinforcing.” This background 
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than the one-shot arm’s length exchange transactions (such as the purchase of a 
used car from its private owner) that most autonomy theorists of contracts 
(usually implicitly) consider as paradigm.75 Various forms of impediments to 
contract—information costs (symmetric and asymmetric), cognitive biases, 
bilateral monopolies, heightened risks of opportunistic behavior, and other 
types of transactions costs (in the broad sense)—are pervasive in these 
contractual settings.76 To be sure, in certain contexts and for some parties, social 
norms and other extralegal reasons for action, or the possibility of ex ante 
explicit contracting may be sufficient. But in a host of other contexts a hands-off 
policy and a hospitable attitude to freedom of contract can hardly suffice to 
overcome these endemic difficulties to long-term cooperation.77 Even where the 
parties are guided by their own social norms—as is often the case with 
relational contracts78—contract law is nonetheless significant in providing the 
parties background reassurances, a safety net for a rainy day that can help 
catalyze trust in their routine interactions.79 Therefore, even when law is rarely 
invoked, contract law’s active empowerment is likely to be essential to the 
viability of these challenging though still significant types of interpersonal 
relationships.80 It is thus no wonder that again we find in each of the 
 
reassurance of contract law “is often indispensable in enabling the parties to develop, possibly over 
time, a relationship that far transcends that set of legally binding rights and duties which the contract 
constituted or recorded in the first place.” KIMEL, supra note 63, at 83. This argument is correct, but it 
hardly captures the breadth of background legal rules needed for the sustainability of the foreground 
social norms. 
 75.  Cf. P.S. Atiyah, Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REV. 509, 516–19 (1981) (reviewing FRIED, supra 
note 2). This means that the attempt to resist the argument of part V, by presenting contract rules that 
apply only to specific transaction types as peripheral to contract law, and generic contract rules—which 
indeed largely anticipate one-shot arm’s length exchange transactions—as its core, cannot work. For 
such an attempt, see Daniel Markovits, Promise as an Arm’s-length Relation, in PROMISES AND 
AGREEMENTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 295 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011). As the text emphasizes, 
marginalizing the former and essentializing the latter is unjustified because contract rules that target 
specific transaction types are no less important for realizing the values we attribute to contract law and 
are no less prevalent in our lives. For a similar claim in the context of property theory, see Hanoch 
Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409 (2012). For a 
particularly provocative critique of treating symmetric discrete arm’s length exchange transactions as 
the core of contract law, see Clyde W. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 
YALE L.J. 525 (1969). 
 76.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
1051 (2000).  
 77.  For a similar claim regarding property law, see Hanoch Dagan, Inside Property, 63 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 1 (2013).  
 78.  See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED 
WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL (David Campbell ed., 2001).  
 79.  See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1793 (1996); Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, 
Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship in Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 
45, 47 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993); see generally Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of 
Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531 (1995) (discussing bases for, and betrayals of, “semi-rational” or “doubting” 
trust).  
 80.  Another important reason for the necessity of legal support is the need to accommodate the 
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corresponding branches of contract law—employment law, agency law, 
partnership law, and landlord–tenant law—robust mechanisms that help to 
overcome these difficulties, thus significantly extending and indeed reshaping 
(rather than merely supporting) the extralegal practice of undertaking 
voluntary obligations.81 
As with consumer transactions, which are a significant subset of the 
anonymous side of the practice of contracts, in many (possibly most) categories 
of relational contracts in which contract law participates in the creation and 
maintenance of trust-based interpersonal relationships, the thin common 
denominator of “general” (basically passive) contract law and remedies would 
not have been sufficient to overcome the inherent risks of such endeavors. In 
taking seriously its mission of fostering the practice of undertaking voluntary 
obligations due to its indispensable role for self-authorship, contract law 
appropriately takes a much more active approach. It facilitates and empowers—
at times even enables—this practice by means that both appreciate the 
thorough heterogeneity of this practice (a subject this article addresses shortly) 
and participate in the creation and reform of social arrangements.82 
The import of contract law’s enabling function may also extend to the 
broader cultural function of law. The thick layer of both defaults and 
mandatory rules that typifies the diverse branches of contract law, such as 
commercial transactions, real-estate transactions, consumer transactions, 
employment contracts, banking contracts, bailment contracts, suretyship 
contracts, family contracts, and the like, offers a series of identifiable contract 
institutions, each of which with its own character, which corresponds (at least 
ideally) to its characteristic subject-matter and the ideal type of relationships it 
anticipates. In this way, contract law participates in the ongoing social 
production of stable categories of human interaction. More precisely, these 
contract institutions consolidate people’s expectations. This happens where the 
contracting parties are sophisticated or where the active players are their 
lawyers. It also happens, albeit in a more attenuated way, once the “character” 
of these institutions gains broad social and cultural recognition, so that people 
 
interests of third parties with whom the parties to these long-term contractual endeavors interact. For 
an example of this in the context of agency law, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 39–51 (1992). 
 81.  See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and 
Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1993); Eric Rasmusen, Agency Law and Contract Formation, 6 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 369 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 289 (2009); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord–Tenant Law: Causes and 
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517 (1984).  
 82.  At times, allowing individuals to choose to engage in different forms of interactions with one 
another requires the deployment of mandatory rules or of sticky defaults, which (respectively) curtail 
or encumber party choice within the relationship. See generally Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt Outs: An 
Economic Analysis of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012). An autonomy-based perspective that 
appreciates the enabling role of contract law would not find mutability necessarily objectionable if its 
overall effects are choice-enhancing. This perspective is also, as the following text indicates, quite 
amenable to default rules that are not simply or necessarily majoritarian. See also infra note 87 and 
accompanying text. 
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roughly know what they are getting into when entering, for example, a 
consumer transaction, purchasing an apartment, or starting a new job.83 
Furthermore, these contract institutions may also affect people’s ideals and 
therefore their preferences with respect to these categories of relationships.84 In 
this latter role, contract institutions perform a significant expressive and cultural 
function. Contractual freedom, significant as it is, cannot replace the law of 
contracts in the consolidation of expectations and the expression of normative 
ideals regarding these categories of interpersonal relationships. 
Indeed, because many of the diverse forms of interpersonal interaction that 
can open up thanks to the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations cannot 
be realistically actualized without active support of diverse, viable, and robust 
legal institutions, contract law should—and does—actively facilitate (within 
limits) the coexistence of these various social spheres, which brings to the fore 
the second major amendment that Raz’s political philosophy offers to 
autonomy-based theories of contract: the prescription of structural pluralism. 
V 
RAZIAN AUTONOMY AND CONTRACT LAW PLURALISM 
On its face, the structural monism of autonomy-based theories of contracts 
is appealing. By conceptualizing the entire domain of contract law as revolving 
around one idea such as will, consent, or voluntary obligations, monist theories 
tend to be parsimonious and elegant, thus satisfying an important demand of 
the practice of theorizing. They also avoid the seemingly intractable difficulties 
of pluralist theories in addressing contextual conflicts of values or contextual 
applications of values. Finally, the broad coherence monist theories celebrate 
means that the law talks to the people with one voice and is thus deserving of 
their obedience. But the lure of monism can and should be resisted, at least if by 
autonomy contract theorists mean self-authorship. Contract theory should take 
seriously the existing structural pluralism of contract law and celebrate, rather 
than suppress (as variations on a common theme) or marginalize (as peripheral 
exceptions to a robust core), the multiple forms typifying contract law. 
Indeed, appreciating the significant enabling role of contract law—and thus 
the need to qualify Raz’s third proposition—also implies similarly revisionist 
conclusions regarding Raz’s fourth proposition: contract law’s structural 
monism. As just noted, an important part of the enabling role of contract law is 
to form effective frameworks of social interaction and cooperation by 
consolidating people’s expectations regarding certain types of voluntary 
obligations and expressing our ideals with respect to these categories of 
relationships. Contract law cannot possibly consolidate expectations and 
 
 83.  See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 787–788 (1995) (discussing the accumulated outcome of the social learning effect and the 
network externalities phenomenon). 
 84.  See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1758–59 (1997). 
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express ideals regarding any idiosyncratic arrangement contractual parties may 
pursue. But it can—and thus should, and indeed does (at least to some 
extent)—perform this role respecting a limited number of core categories of 
such arrangements.85 In other words, like other branches of private law, contract 
law should follow the prescriptions of structural pluralism.86 
A structurally pluralist contract law includes different and sufficiently 
diverse types of contracts (different contract institutions) for the diverse social 
settings and economic functions in which law facilitates the practice of 
undertaking voluntary obligations. Each such contract institution—consider 
again, for example, commercial transactions, consumer transactions, 
employment contracts, and family contracts—incorporates a distinct balance of 
values, and is thus governed by a distinct regulative principle suitable to its 
subject matter. This rich repertoire enables people to freely choose their own 
ends, principles, forms of life, and associations.87 Although at a certain point the 
marginal value from adding another distinct institution is likely to be nominal in 
terms of autonomy, pluralism implies that contract law’s supply of these 
multiple institutions should be guided not only by demand. Demand for certain 
institutions generally justifies their legal facilitation. But a contract law regime 
that follows Raz’s account of personal autonomy prioritizes settings, such as 
those discussed earlier,88 in which law’s enabling role is most acute for the 
practice of undertaking voluntary obligations to flourish.89 Furthermore, 
although it is difficult to expect that such a regime would invent new contract 
institutions, it should favorably respond to people’s innovations even absent 
significant demand,90 including innovations based on minority views and utopian 
theories,91 insofar as they have the potential to add valuable options of human 
flourishing that significantly broaden people’s choices.92 
 
 85.  Cf. HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 31–35 (2011) (explaining the 
role of property law’s numerus clausus principle in similar terms).  
 86.  The following paragraphs draw on Dagan, supra note 75, at 1410–13, 1426. Cf. J.E. Penner, 
Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of Contract, 2 LEGAL THEORY 325, 357 (1996) 
(acknowledging the challenge that relational contracts pose to a unified conception of contract as a 
voluntary obligation).  
 87.  The choice among contract institutions adds, of course, to the choice within each one of these 
institutions given the mutability of many (possibly most) contract law rules. See also supra note 82.  
 88.  See supra text accompanying notes 70–81.  
 89.  It should be noted that a pluralist contract law may require awareness of the risks posed by 
interest group rent seeking to which certain contract institutions, and thus certain forms dividing the 
domain of contract law, may be vulnerable. See Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract 
Law, 98 GEO. L. J. 77, 86–90 (2009).  
 90.  But cf. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts 
in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 91.  Indeed, rather than inhibiting experimentalism—as Oman, supra note 89, at 94–105, argues—a 
pluralist contract law, at least in its Razian rendition, fosters experimentalism.  
 92.  One example that may be particularly timely is job-sharing arrangements in which typically the 
job sharers are “individually responsible for certain aspects of the job and jointly responsible for 
others.” Part-Time & Job Sharing, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONAL MANAGEMENT, 
http://www.opm.gov/employment_and_benefits/worklife/officialdocuments/handbooksguides/pt_emplo
y_jobsharing/pt08.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). Although there are numerous possible configurations, 
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Such a structurally pluralist contract law recognizes and promotes the 
individuality-enhancing role of multiplicity, so germane to a Razian 
commitment to self-authorship.93 As Raz argues in criticizing Ronald Dworkin’s 
espousal of coherence as an independent value, in a world of incommensurable 
human values, a monist legal voice is repressive, and normative coherence is 
justified if, but only if, it is local, rather than global and derives from the 
normative injunction to found a given area of the law on one certain value or on 
a given balance among pertinent values.94 This means that despite the appeal of 
the global coherence of monist theories of contract, it is reasonable and even 
desirable for law to adopt more than one set of regulative principles and, 
therefore, more than one set of coherent contract institutions.95 
Indeed, the liberal commitment to autonomy neither necessitates the 
hegemony of the so-called classical model of contract, which is typically 
reflected in the monist conceptions of contract, nor does it undermine the value 
of other contract institutions, whose regulative principles focus on the intrinsic 
good of the parties’ interpersonal relationships or on the maximization of their 
joint surplus.96 On the contrary, the availability of several different but equally 
valuable and obtainable frameworks of interpersonal interaction makes 
autonomy more meaningful by facilitating people’s ability to choose and revise 
their various endeavors and interpersonal interactions. Thus, what would look 
like a random mess from a monist viewpoint seeking to pigeonhole contract law 
in its entirety under the rule of one regulative principle (such as will or 
consent), turns out to be a rich mosaic once a perspective of structural pluralism 
is utilized. This mosaic is valuable—indeed, indispensable—for Razian 
autonomy. Although the symmetrical and discrete arm’s length exchange 
contract—the contract institution that is anticipated by will and consent 
theorists—is one important form of voluntary obligations, the law’s support for 
other contract institutions is just as crucial for autonomy. 
But is this mosaic of contract institutions guided by different regulative 
principles that represent distinctive balances of values indeed entailed by the 
Razian commitment to ensure a broad range of valuable options? Wouldn’t a 
more neutral regime, which equally supports all the possible arrangements that 
 
law can facilitate these innovative arrangements by stabilizing defaults regarding responsibility 
attribution, decision making mechanisms, time division, sharing space and equipment, and availability 
of off days. See David G. Javitch, The Pros and Cons of Job Sharing, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 10, 2006), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/170244. 
 93.  Cf. RAZ, supra note 51, at 417–18, 425. 
 94.  See JOSEPH RAZ, The Relevance of Coherence, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN 
THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 261, 281–82, 291–304 (1994).  
 95.  This is also one of the most important legacies of Karl Llewellyn. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, A 
Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 3, 
27–28, 32 (1962); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, Some Realism about Realism, in JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 
42, 59–60; KARL N. LLEWELLYN, The Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition, in JURISPRUDENCE, 
supra, at 215, 217, 219–20; Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 
872, 880, 904 (1939). 
 96.  See respectively MACNEIL, supra note 78; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6.  
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people might want to take up, be sufficient for the task? If the analysis thus far 
is convincing, it also implies that the answer to this challenge is that there is no 
such neutral law of contract. Because contract law cannot equally support all 
these arrangements and since its support makes a difference—very few contract 
types would have looked as they do and would have worked as well as they do 
without the law—contract law needs to prefer certain types of arrangements 
over others, and its choices inevitably affect the set of options that are available, 
or at least more available, to people.97 
Understanding contracts along these structurally pluralist lines is not 
radical—quite the contrary. As Roy Kreitner argues, preclassical contract law 
used to be arranged according to typical contractual relationships. And 
notwithstanding (or possibly due to) the great unifying force of the classical 
contract theory that followed, we have witnessed a constant development of 
specialized fields of contract. As Kreitner further claims, this “grouping . . . of 
fact situations by contract type”98 appropriately links contract theory “with the 
practices of contracting parties and the courts,”99 and it supplies “some guidance 
regarding the relative weight of conflicting contract principles.”100 It also 
provides “an understanding of contract that respects the multiplicity of . . . 
purposes inherent in contract law” and the way in which different purposes 
“take on varying levels of importance with regard to the different types of 
contract.”101 
Indeed, in various realms of life contract law provides standardized forms of 
interpersonal interaction which serve to stabilize expectations and express 
ideals: the regulative principles that explain the doctrinal details of these 
contract institutions can (and often do) guide their further development. Thus, 
family contracts, such as premarital agreements and separation agreements, are 
governed by a unique set of rules—think about the fairness review that typifies 
the former and the possible judicial modification for change of circumstances 
that characterizes the latter—which derive more from the typical characteristics 
of the parties and the character of their joint endeavor than from any general 
principle of contract as a whole.102 Furthermore, regarding certain types of 
activities, contract law devises, in compliance with the injunction of structural 
 
 97.  The modest perfectionism of contract law implied in this proposition is even more conspicuous 
in the rules governing unenforceable agreements dealing with not-unlawful activities, such as 
unreasonable restrictive covenants. See Stephen A. Smith, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract, 59 
MODERN L. REV. 167, 179–80 (1995). 
 98.  Roy Kreitner, Multiplicity in Contract Remedies, in COMPARATIVE REMEDIES FOR BREACH 
OF CONTRACTS 19, 38 (Nili Cohen & Ewan McKendrick eds., 2005).  
 99.  Id. at 20. 
 100.  Id. at 38. 
 101.  Id. at 19–20. 
 102.  See Brian H. Bix, Contract Rights and Remedies, and the Divergence Between Law and 
Morality, 21 RATIO JURIS 194, 203 (2008). For the regulative principle of marital property law, see 
DAGAN, supra note 85, at 197–228. For a thorough discussion of the legal treatment of agreements in 
family matters, see Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL 
LAW 249 (2010).  
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pluralism, more than one set of defaults, so as to facilitate more than one type 
of interpersonal interaction. This is most clearly the case regarding long-term 
business arrangements, for which contract law (in the appropriate, broad sense 
of the word) offers multiple forms, from agency contracts, through partnership 
contracts (notably LLCs and LLPs), to the various forms of corporate contracts 
(from close corporations to publicly-held corporations).103 Each of these 
contract institutions is typified by its own governance structure and its own set 
of solutions to the typical difficulties (notably agency costs) that would probably 
have inhibited such business activities but for their legal facilitation.104 To some 
extent, this variety also typifies the realm of employment and labor law,105 given 
the distinction between the ideal-types of different doctrines governing 
employment relations on the one hand and hiring of independent contractors 
on the other. At least ideally, this distinction follows from whether the pertinent 
work arrangement is typified by significant and inherent vulnerabilities 
respecting constitutive features of the worker’s identity and membership in 
society, which justifies the employee-protective measures characteristic of 
employment contract law.106 
A pluralist conception of contract does not eliminate contract law as a legal 
field. There are sufficient similarities among the various contract institutions to 
justify teaching them in one introductory class or having them as the subject 
matter of unified scholarly reflections. These similarities, however, often only 
mean that the various institutions of contract law raise similar questions (for 
example, whether judges who interpret a contract should focus exclusively on 
its language or also analyze the circumstances surrounding its formation) and 
that there is some overlap in the pertinent values that affect the regulative 
principles of at least some of these diverse institutions (for example, maximizing 
the joint surplus of the contracting parties or facilitating the cooperative 
governance of the performance of their respective obligations107). These 
similarities imply that the broad category of contract law offers a toolbox of 
 
 103.  See generally, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (3d ed. 2009); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF UNCORPORATION (2010). 
 104.  See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 34–35 (1991). 
 105.  As the text implies, analyzing the intervention of contract law in the realm of labor from the 
perspective of structural pluralism may still challenge the sufficiency of the choice between working as 
an employee and working as an independent contractor. In this case—and possibly in other examples 
dealing with other activities—a structural pluralist account of contract law turns out to have important 
critical ramifications.  
 106.  See Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of 
Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357 (2002). It is, to be sure, questionable whether 
employment contract law is sufficiently employee-protective. See, e.g., Marion Crain, Arm’s Length 
Legitimacy: Employment as Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 163 (2011).   
 107.  The text hints to the attention an autonomy-based pluralist contract law must pay to 
governance as a means to communitarian interpersonal interactions and not only to efficient 
performance. More generally, unlike contract institutions from which parties seek to derive efficiency 
gains, contract institutions that are invoked for more communitarian purposes are not easily amenable 
to a maximization function.  
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normative commitments and sociological insights, which explains why reflecting 
on the variety of contract institutions is likely to helpfully yield some cross-
fertilization. They do not imply, however, the type of normative coherence 
needed in order to justify making the classification as member of these wide 
areas of law a reason for any concrete prescriptive consequence.108 
Recently, Kreitner offered a “pluralist statement” of the conception of 
contract that coheres, in my view, with the revised Razian account offered in 
this article (even if it relies on different normative commitments). Contract, in 
Kreitner’s view, is “an encompassing and multi-faceted institution” that has no 
core109: “there is no one idea that encapsulates the sine qua non of contract, no 
nodal point from which all the instantiations of the institution of contract 
flow.”110 Contract, in this view, is “a framework for cooperation among societal 
agents,” which “serves as an infrastructure that provides a means to carry out a 
range of collaborative projects.”111 This infrastructure “provides benefits even to 
those who are not using it at any given moment, because it structures in 
productive ways the interactions (actual and potential) among past, present, 
and future participants.”112 
VI 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Autonomy-based theories of contracts tend to ascribe a rather modest role 
to the law and to conceptualize contract law as a unified body of doctrine 
governed by one regulative principle. But if autonomy stands for the 
commitment that people should, to some degree, be the authors of their own 
lives, both of these typical features are wrong or at least exaggerated. An 
autonomy-based contract law should be attentive to the pluralist prescription of 
offering people a sufficiently diverse set of robust frameworks to organize their 
various endeavors and interpersonal relationships. And it should actively 
empower people’s attempts to form collaborative contractual arrangements—
both discrete and impersonal, as well as long-term and relational—by providing 
the necessary background regime for such risky undertakings. 
This approach to contract law as an umbrella for diverse contract 
institutions, which stand for diverse ideals of the various types of social 
relationships and economic functions contracts serve, may seem naïve because 
law often falls short of the ideals many contract institutions represent. But these 
gaps only mean that, rather than searching for a unifying regulative principle of 
contract law in its entirety, the main task of an autonomy-based contract theory 
is to distill the distinct regulative principles of the various contract institutions, 
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to elucidate the ways each of them contributes to human flourishing, and to 
offer reform, if needed, that would force these contract institutions to live up to 
their own implicit promises.113 
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